The Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament published its Report on Iran today. This is the result of an extensive Inquiry, which took evidence from August 2021 to August 2023. The Inquiry was conducted by the previous Committee: the Committee would like to thank the Rt Hon. Sir Julian Lewis MP and the previous members of the Committee for their work. The Committee considered a substantial volume of written evidence and numerous evidence sessions were held with a range of witnesses. The Committee is particularly grateful to those experts from outside the Intelligence Community for volunteering their insights on Iran, which provided an invaluable foundation for the Inquiry. The Committee concluded its evidence-taking for this Inquiry in August 2023 – before Hamas’s terrorist attack on Israel on 7 October 2023. This Report does not therefore consider the attack, and whether the attack had a connection to Iran, however it does note that Iran has historically provided Hamas with weapons, cyber assistance and financial support. 

Whilst the Report does not consider subsequent events – including the recent strikes on Iran – it provides essential context and consideration of all elements of the Iranian threat to the UK. It assesses what the UK Intelligence Community is doing to respond, and what more needs to be done. The landscape in the Middle East has changed significantly since the Committee concluded its evidence-taking, however the Report’s recommendations remain relevant.

The Chairman of the ISC, the Rt Hon. the Lord Beamish, said:

“Iran poses a wide-ranging, persistent and unpredictable threat to the UK, UK nationals, and UK interests. Iran has a high appetite for risk when conducting offensive activity and its intelligence services are ferociously well-resourced with significant areas of asymmetric strength. It supplements this with its use of proxy groups – including criminal networks, militant and terrorist organisations, and private cyber actors – to provide it with a deniable means of attacking its adversaries with minimal risk of retaliation. As the Committee was told, Iran is there across the full spectrum of all the kinds of threats we have to be concerned with. 

This Report considers each element of that threat – including assassination and kidnap, the nuclear programme, espionage, offensive cyber, interference and intimidation. It then examines how the UK Intelligence Community is responding to these challenges, in order to keep the UK safe. We highlight in particular our concern at the sharp increase in the physical threat posed to dissidents and other opponents of the regime who are in the UK – given Iran’s willingness to use assassination as an instrument of state policy; the significant threat of Iranian espionage in support of potential future lethal activity; the importance of negotiating a form of de-escalation between Iran and the international community to deal with the Iranian nuclear threat; and the need both to raise the resilience bar to improve cyber security in the UK and to raise the cost to Iran of launching a cyber attack on the UK so as to deter them from so doing.

The Committee welcomes the changes already made by the Government in response to the Committee’s recommendations (which they received in April 2024: publication of the Report was significantly delayed by the Election last year). These include the designation of Iran under the Enhanced Tier of the Foreign Influence Registration Scheme and the creation of a new power of proscription to cover state-backed organisations such as the IRGC. However, gaps remain: for example, the Government now appears to be backtracking on its commitment to Parliament to take forward reform of the Official Secrets Act 1989.

We remain concerned that the Government’s policy on Iran has suffered from a focus on crisis management and has been primarily driven by concerns over Iran’s nuclear programme – to the exclusion of other issues. ‘Fire-fighting’ has prevented the Government from developing a real understanding of Iran, with a lack of Iran-specific expertise across Government. As with our previous Inquiries into China and Russia, governance structures are over-complicated – with the attendant risk of too much talking at the expense of action. The Government must move on: the national security threat from Iran requires a longer-term view, and resourcing must be consistent with that threat.”

The Report’s Key Findings follow (the Key Findings are quotes from the Report itself).

Focus on Survival 

How does the Iranian threat compare?

The Supreme Leader and Iran’s Intelligence Services 

Iran’s Alliances and Networks

Physical Attacks 

The Nuclear Weapons Programme

The Espionage Threat

Iranian Cyber Capabilities

Interference Activity

The Threat to UK interests in the Middle East

HMG’s Strategy and Policy Response

The Intelligence Community’s work with International Partners

Use of Legislation to disrupt Iranian threats to the UK and UK interests

IRAN REPORT KEY FINDINGS

Focus on survival:

The Iranian regime’s fundamental objective is to ensure the survival and security of the Islamic Republic: it has an acute historic sense of vulnerability. This shapes – directly or indirectly – all of its actions. This focus on survival means Iran is a pragmatic actor, often driven more by opportunism than ideology (more ‘securitocracy’ than theocracy). Whilst Iran favours proportionality in relation to conflict, this is not always achievable or pragmatic as it wants to avoid a full-scale war. It therefore has focussed on the development of ‘asymmetric’ capabilities and a network of aligned militant and terrorist organisations across the Middle East to spread influence and deter potential aggressors. 

Iran is motivated by both defensive and offensive considerations. Much of Iran’s foreign policy – and the threat it represents to the UK – is borne of an historical sense of its regional importance; a fear of encirclement by better-equipped Western adversaries; a history of perceived foreign interference in Iran; and the formative experience of the Iran-Iraq War. Iran’s main strategic objectives towards the UK include reducing the UK’s military presence in the region; undermining the UK’s relationships with the US and Israel; weakening the UK’s security relationships in the Middle East; and silencing criticism of Iran, either from the UK directly or from those residing in the UK. 

Iran and the UK have a complex history. Iran’s leadership perceives the UK to be a significant adversary – a “cunning fox” – opposed to the Iranian regime’s values and – as part of the West – to be seeking regime change in Iran. The Chair of the Joint Intelligence Committee told the ISC that:

“there is a deep suspicion [of the UK] for historical reasons as well as relatively contemporary reasons”.

How does the Iranian threat compare?

Whilst Iran’s activity appears to be less strategic and on a smaller scale than Russia and China, Iran poses a wide-ranging threat to UK national security, which should not be underestimated: it is persistent and – crucially – unpredictable. As the then Home Secretary The Rt Hon. Suella Braverman KC MP cautioned:

“the Iranian Intelligence Services pose a persistent and sophisticated threat to the United Kingdom and to our interests overseas. We are no doubt a priority for Iran.”

Director General MI5 told us:

“they present across all the different forms of threat … the full spectrum of the kinds of threats we have to be concerned with.”

The Intelligence Community told the Committee that:

“Iran has a particular role in the [Middle East] region…but if you think about it more as a threat to the United Kingdom…[they] would be top of the Championship rather than the Premier League, but rising. Russia and China … have a scale and a capability which Iran cannot match. [But] what Iran has, is a risk appetite which is very ‘pokey’ indeed.”

The threat posed by Iran is also linked to the state of the bilateral relationship with the UK: it could change depending on the UK’s international engagement or a specific action or policy.

While Iran is fundamentally a rational actor, it does not always appear to act in a coherent way and is prone to misunderstanding actions that others take.

The Supreme Leader and Iran’s Intelligence Services:

The Supreme Leader of Iran wields tremendous power – he is the ultimate decision-maker, setting the direction of Iranian foreign and domestic policy. In terms of the threat posed by Iran to the UK and its interests, the Supreme Leader is therefore key. The Iranian threat appeared to increase following the election of the former Iranian President Raisi who was more ideologically aligned with Iran’s Supreme Leader than his predecessor. The organisations within the Iranian Intelligence Services – primarily the Ministry of Intelligence and Security and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, representing the republican and revolutionary organs of state respectively – have overlapping remits which results in fierce competition, tension and disagreement. Activity may therefore not always be effectively coordinated nor centrally authorised.

The Committee considers that the relative autonomy of, and factionalism within, Iran’s Intelligence Services increase the risk of unmanaged escalation and contributes to a worrying unpredictability around the Iranian threat to the UK and UK interests in the Middle East.

Iran’s alliances and networks:

Iran’s acute sense of its position in the region – including its perceived vulnerability –drives its strategy toward its international partnerships. For example, Iran wants to build a deep alliance with Russia, and the relationship is becoming increasingly close – despite a legacy of distrust and suspicion – particularly since the Russian invasion of Ukraine, with Iran providing weaponry to Russia. The relationship is driven by political expediency rather than ideological connection. 

China is Iran’s largest trade and economic partner, and they share a world view driven by preserving regime legitimacy, a sense of grievance in relation to past foreign interference, and a suspicion of the West. Iran has developed a network of complex relationships with militant and terrorist groups across the Middle East to which it provides differing levels and types of support. This provides Iran with a deniable means of threatening its adversaries – such as UK armed forces and the UK’s regional allies – and undermining Western interests in the region with minimal risk of retaliation against Iranian territory.

The varying level of control that Iran exercises over its network of aligned militant and terrorist groups – and the different interests represented within it – exacerbates the unpredictability of the Iranian-backed threat in the Middle East and risks an escalation of aggression in the region. Militant and terrorist groups in the Middle East which have a relationship with, and to varying degrees receive support from, Iran include Al-Qaeda, Kata’ib Hizbollah in Iraq, Lebanese Hizbollah and Hamas.

The transactional arrangement between Iran and the senior leadership of Al Qaeda (AQ) is concerning. The Government should use all the tools at its disposal to degrade the relationship between Iran and groups such as Al-Qaeda and Lebanese Hizbollah, including publicly calling out Iran’s attempts to protect such terrorist groups.

Physical Attacks:

Since the beginning of 2022, there has been a significant increase in the physical threat posed by Iran to those residing in the UK. It has significantly increased both in pace and with regard to the number of threats. This threat is focused acutely on dissidents and other opponents of the regime. There is also an increased threat against Jewish and Israeli interests in the UK. The Iranian Intelligence Services have shown that they are willing and able – often through third-party agents – to attempt assassination within the UK, and kidnap from the UK: there have been at least 15 attempts at murder or kidnap against British nationals or UK-based individuals since the beginning of 2022. 

The Homeland Security Group told us that the threat of physical attack on individuals in the UK is now “the greatest level of threat we currently face from Iran”, and comparable with the threat posed by Russia. Iran does not view attacks on dissident, Jewish and Israeli targets in the UK as attacks on the UK. It rather sees the UK as collateral in its handling of internal matters – i.e. removing perceived enemies of the regime – on UK soil. 

We commend the efforts of MI5 and the police in response to what is now a serious threat, and we encourage the Government and its international partners to make it clear to Iran – at every opportunity – that such attacks would indeed constitute an attack on the UK and would receive the appropriate response.

The nuclear weapons programme:

Iran proceeding with its nuclear weapons programme would pose a threat both to UK nationals in the region and to the UK mainland – and to global security more broadly if it led to regional nuclear proliferation and exacerbated regional instability.

As at August 2023, it appeared that Iran had not yet developed a nuclear weapon nor taken a decision to produce one, but it maintained the option of developing one – largely as the ‘ultimate security guarantee’. It is difficult to determine what would trigger such a decision by the Supreme Leader: it is plausible that Iran’s intent is to maintain a state of ‘nuclear ambiguity’ at the threshold of weaponisation, however it may choose to weaponise if it feels it is facing an existential threat.

Whilst the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) nuclear agreement had its limitations, the Intelligence Community believes that – before the US’s withdrawal in 2018 – Iran was broadly compliant with the restrictions on its nuclear programme. Since the US’s withdrawal from the JCPOA, the Iranian nuclear threat has increased as Iran has taken steps in developing its nuclear programme.

As at August 2023, while it appeared that Iran was still short of the ‘weaponisation’ phase, the potential timelines had reduced over the last few years and Iran had the capability to arm in a relatively short period. Given the increase in the Iranian nuclear threat at the time of concluding our Inquiry in 

August 2023, negotiating a form of de-escalation between Iran and the international community must be a priority. This may be a limited successor to the JCPOA, a broader multi-lateral agreement dealing with regional security or separate bilateral agreements with Iran: all would serve to reduce the current high tension.

The espionage threat:

Iran poses a significant espionage threat to the UK and its interests, projected primarily via cyber capabilities, but also via human agents. Whilst as a target, the UK appears to remain just below the US, Israel and Saudi Arabia, this prioritisation could change depending on geopolitical developments and the relationship between Iran and the UK. The espionage threat is focused on supporting Iran’s primary objective of regime stability: it is substantially narrower in scope and scale, and less sophisticated than that posed by Russia and China. In the UK, the Iranian Intelligence Services prioritise targeting opponents of the regime, HMG and sectors that provide the Iranian regime with a strategic advantage such as academia and defence.

The JIC Chair told the Committee:

“we are a priority target … for Iran in an espionage sense … [for two main reasons] … because they regard the United Kingdom as a particularly malevolent opponent of the Islamic Republic and, secondly, because of the role we play in nuclear negotiations and the relationship which we have with the United States, which [Iran] regards as being of significant interest.”

Iranian cyber capabilities:

Offensive cyber is a prime example of Iran’s use of asymmetric capabilities. Iran is an aggressive cyber actor with extensive capabilities and, whilst Iran does not possess the same sophisticated capability as Russia and China, the cyber threat posed by Iran is significant. The Iranian cyber threat landscape is complex, with cyber groups ranging from state-controlled actors responding to direct tasking, to private cyber actors working for personal gain or perceived state intelligence requirements. Whilst Iranian cyber actors often use simple computer network exploitation techniques, they use them very effectively, exploiting basic vulnerabilities that many organisations have, including in the UK. Offensive cyber – by which we mean both destructive and disruptive cyber-attacks – allows Iran to attack and contain Western and regional adversaries without resorting to conventional military action. It also provides Iran with a deniable tool with which to attack its enemies, respond to perceived aggression and project power in the region – and globally.

As at August 2023, when this Report concluded its evidence-taking, it appeared that the UK is not a top priority for Iranian offensive cyber activity and, in the current environment, Iran may not attempt an offensive cyber-attack specifically to damage the UK. Nevertheless, we note that this could change rapidly in response to regional or geopolitical developments: the likelihood has increased, for example, in connection with the 2023 protests in Iran. 

If Iran decided to conduct an offensive cyber-attack on an adversary such as the UK, the petrochemical, utilities, and finance sectors could be at risk. According to the National Cyber Security Centre, it is unlikely that all UK entities are able to detect or defend against Iranian offensive cyber activity. The Committee has previously expressed concerns about Government complacency in allowing Russian pre-positioning for an attack through widespread penetration of UK critical national infrastructure. It is vital that the same mistakes are not made in relation to Iran – particularly given Iran’s proven capability to cause serious disruption to essential services.

It is essential to ‘raise the resilience bar’: if there is good cyber security and resilience across the UK then it is less likely that Iran’s cyber-attacks will be successful. NCSC’s work to illuminate the tools and techniques used by Iranian cyber groups, and to warn UK organisations that they are being targeted is therefore key to defending the UK. The National Cyber Force (NCF), which was established in 2020, has specific responsibility for UK offensive cyber activity. Given the threat posed by Iran’s cyber capability, the NCF has a vital role to play in the UK’s response. The UK must raise the cost to Iran of it launching a cyber-attack on the UK, so as to deter it from doing so: public attribution of attacks is a valuable tool (albeit not without risk).”

Interference activity:

Whilst the UK is a high priority target for Iranian interference activity due to its role in multilateral negotiations relating to Iran and the presence of several Iranian-language news outlets in the UK which are critical of the regime, it is not as important as the US, Israel, Saudi Arabia or other Middle Eastern states. Overall HMG considers that Iran’s interference operations have had a negligible effect on UK public opinion and decision-makers, including in relation to UK elections. The focus of Iran’s interference operations – and of most concern – are the attempts to intimidate Iranian dissidents and those working for media organisations such as Iran International in the UK and beyond. Some reports suggest Iran’s efforts to intimidate the regime’s perceived opponents have had a significant impact on the Iranian diaspora community in the UK.

The Threat to UK interests in the Middle East:

The UK has substantial security and commercial interests in the Middle East, which are at risk from Iranian hostile activity. This includes a physical threat to UK nationals in Iran, a threat to UK maritime and commercial interests in the region and a security threat in respect of terrorism, increased migration and nuclear proliferation. Iran has a broad range of tools it could deploy including missiles and drones (which it could use against Israel, regional US bases – where UK forces are collocated – and Gulf energy infrastructure), its network of militant and terrorist forces, chemical weapons, offensive cyber and disruption of shipping in the Gulf.

As at August 2023, the Iranian physical threat to UK nationals in the Middle East had increased as a result of the 2023 internal protests in Iran. Detention remains the primary physical threat to British citizens in Iran, and is heightened in relation to dual nationals – particularly because dual nationality is not recognised by Iran. The threat of arbitrary detention has increased since the 2023 protests in Iran. The threat of collateral damage to UK armed forces stationed in the region (resulting from misidentification or miscalculation) is the main physical risk to British nationals in the Middle East – outside of Iran – due to their sizeable number and co-location with the more heavily targeted US forces.

Given the volatility of the situation, the potential for misunderstanding and miscalculation by Iran, and the possibility for rapid escalation, it is not unrealistic to think that at some point it could become necessary to evacuate UK nationals in the region. The Committee notes the importance of proper preparation for a possible evacuation. The Government must ensure that it has learned the lessons from recent evacuation operations such as the withdrawal from Afghanistan.

HMG’s strategy and policy response:

“The Government’s policy on Iran has suffered from a focus on crisis management, driven by concerns over Iran’s nuclear programme, to the exclusion of other issues. ‘Fire-fighting’ has prevented the Government from carrying out longer-term thinking and developing a real understanding of Iran, and the complexity of the problem. As one of our expert witnesses told the Committee:

“Strategy is not a word that I think has crossed the lips of policy-makers for a while, certainly with relation to Iran … Iran policy over the last twenty years has been a series of crisis management ….”.

The Government must stop its short-termist, reactive approach: ‘longer-term’ must mean the next five, ten, and twenty years, not 6-12 months.

Resourcing on Iran has fluctuated over the past decade, supporting the concern that the response to the Iranian threat has been short-termist. It is important that resourcing on Iran is consistent with the threat; the Government should take a longer-term view. Across Government, there is a lack of Iran-specific expertise and seemingly no interest in building a future pipeline of specialists, beyond mention in a Strategy campaign. We were particularly struck by one critique:

“if you have people running policy in the Foreign Office who don’t speak a word of Persian, then that is a fat lot of good, to be honest”.

As with our previous Inquiries into national security issues relating to China and Russia, the Government appears to over-complicate governance structures and strategies – with the attendant risk of too much talking, at the expense of action. There is no sense from anyone we spoke to of how the various Government strategies on Iran relate to each other, which of them takes precedence – or, crucially, who is responsible for driving implementation and will be held accountable. 

The Government’s response to the Iranian threat appears to be wrapped up with state threats or the Middle East. This may be positive if it means that Iran will benefit from synergies with work to counter other – perhaps more prominent – state threats. However, the risk is that this instead results in a less tailored and therefore less effective response to the Iranian threat. The Iranian threat is quite different in many respects and it is essential that it receives sufficient priority and that Russia and China do not crowd out other concerns. On the same grounds, we are concerned that there have been so few National Security Council meetings on Iran.

The Counter-State Threats Strategy has taken four years to develop – whilst this is an extraordinarily long time to wait for such a key piece of work, the Committee cannot provide Parliament or the public with any assurance that it was worth the wait: as at August 2023, the Government had failed to provide the Committee with the Strategy. We regard this as completely unacceptable: this Committee has been given the statutory responsibility for oversight of such matters, and we question what the Government’s reasons were for withholding it.

The Intelligence Community’s work with international partners:

The Agencies’ close collaboration with the US and other international partners in relation to the Iran threat appears to be one of their greatest assets: it yields great value and lessens burdens. However, it also appears to be a potential vulnerability, in that if this arrangement were to cease it is doubtful whether the Intelligence Community would be able to respond to the Iranian threat anywhere near as effectively. Most countries – even our closest allies – will operate under different legal and ethical constraints to the UK. However, to protect the UK we have no choice but to work with other countries. The framework under which our Agencies engage is therefore of the utmost importance. The evidence we have received reassures us that where HMG engages in a joint operation, UK ‘red lines’ are made clear to ensure that legal and policy boundaries are observed and that, wherever possible, appropriate due diligence is carried out to ensure that information is not obtained via prohibited methods. However, we note that that cannot be guaranteed.

Use of Legislation to disrupt Iranian threats to the UK and UK interests:

We welcome the National Security Act 2023, which will fill important legislative gaps in tackling state threats. However, other gaps will remain unless the Official Secrets Act 1989 is reformed. As at August 2023, the Government appeared to be backtracking on its commitment to Parliament to take this forward: this is of significant concern given the problems with the current regime.

As at August 2023, no decision had been taken as to whether Iran would be designated under the Enhanced Tier of the Foreign Influence Registration Scheme. The Committee therefore stated in its Report that it would be surprised if Iran were not deemed worthy of inclusion under the Enhanced Tier and that if it were not, it is hard to see which countries would be. 

As at August 2023, the UK had imposed financial sanctions on 508 individuals and 1189 entities relating to Iran. The majority of these are companies involved with the nuclear programme, but they also include sanctions for human rights issues. Given the scepticism we heard from External Experts as to the efficacy of sanctions, the Government should reconsider whether sanctions will in practice deliver behavioural change, or in fact unhelpfully push Iran towards China.

As at August 2023, the Government had not made any decision around proscribing the IRGC. The Committee recognised the complexities inherent in such a decision. It is clear that it would come with diplomatic implications: it appeared that the real problem was that the Government was paralysed by the legal and practical difficulties around proscription of a state organisation – given that membership of an organisation proscribed in the UK could lead to arrest and prosecution and a custodial sentence, which would apply to around a quarter of the Iranian cabinet. The Report recommends that Government should fully examine whether it would be practicable to proscribe the IRGC and, if so, detail the competing arguments in a full statement to Parliament.

[TO READ THE FULL REPORT, CLICK HERE.]

NOTES TO EDITORS

1. The Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament is a statutory committee of Parliament (not a Select Committee), with powers under the Justice and Security Act 2013.

2. The Committee consists of nine members drawn from both Houses of Parliament. The Members are appointed by Parliament and the Chair is elected by the Members of the Committee (not by the Prime Minister).

3. The Committee oversees the intelligence and security activities of the UK Intelligence Community. The Committee was originally established by the Intelligence Services Act 1994, and was reformed, and its powers reinforced, by the Justice and Security Act 2013. The Members of the Committee are subject to Section 1(1)(b) of the Official Secrets Act 1989 and are routinely given access to highly classified material in carrying out their duties. 

4. Its remit includes oversight of the policies, expenditure, administration and operations of MI5, MI6 (the Secret Intelligence Service or SIS) and the Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ). The Committee also scrutinises the work of the other parts of the Intelligence Community, including the Joint Intelligence Organisation and the National Security Secretariat in the Cabinet Office; Defence Intelligence in the Ministry of Defence; Homeland Security Group in the Home Office; and the National Cyber Force.

5. Commitments were made to Parliament that the Committee would oversee all security and intelligence activity across Government. The Committee is therefore seeking to ensure that its remit covers those parts of policy departments which have been given security responsibilities since 2013. The Committee’s remit can be updated by way of a simple exchange of letters between the Prime Minister and the Committee.

6. This Report is the result of an Inquiry conducted by the previous Committee, which sat from July 2020 to May 2024. The Committee took evidence from August 2021 to August 2023. It completed its report in November 2023. The Report was going through pre-publication checks at the point the Election was called in May 2024. After the Election the new Committee was not re-constituted until December 2024. The new Committee was not in a position to complete the pre-publication checks until June 2025, but sent its Report to the Prime Minister on 27 March 2025.

7. The previous Committee consisted of:

• The Rt Hon. Sir Julian Lewis MP (Chairman)
• The Rt Hon. Angela Eagle MP (from 16 January 2024)
• The Rt Hon. Maria Eagle MP (from 9 February 2022 until 8 September 2023)
• The Rt Hon. Sir John Hayes CBE MP
• The Rt Hon. Stewart Hosie MP (until 14 December 2022)
• The Rt Hon. Dame Diana Johnson DBE MP (until 14 January 2022)
• The Rt Hon. Kevan Jones MP (now The Rt Hon. The Lord Beamish)
• The Rt Hon. Mark Pritchard MP (until 22 January 2022)
• Colonel The Rt Hon. Bob Stewart DSO MP (from August 2020)
• The Rt Hon. Owen Thompson MP (from 7 February 2023)
• The Rt Hon. Theresa Villiers MP (NOTE: The Rt Hon. Theresa Villiers MP recused herself from the Intelligence and Security Committee’s Inquiry into national security issues relating to Iran. Ms Villiers regularly makes public statements on Iran and was mindful of the constraints that being involved in the ISC’s Iran Inquiry would place on her ability to continue to do so. Ms Villiers was therefore not involved in any stage of the Committee’s Inquiry.)
• Admiral The Rt Hon. Lord West of Spithead GCB DSC PC
• The Rt Hon. Sir Jeremy Wright KC MP (from 9 February 2022)

8. The current Committee – appointed in December 2024 – consists of: 

• The Rt Hon. the Lord Beamish (Chairman)
• The Rt Hon. Sir Jeremy Wright KC MP (Deputy Chairman)
• The Baroness Brown of Cambridge DBE FREng FRS
• Peter Dowd MP
• Richard Foord MP 
• The Rt Hon. Sir John Hayes CBE MP
• Jessica Morden MP 
• Derek Twigg MP 
• Admiral The Rt Hon. Lord West of Spithead GCB DSC PC

9. The Committee sets its own agenda and work programme. It takes evidence from Government Ministers, the Heads of the intelligence and security Agencies, officials from across the Intelligence Community, and other witnesses as required. The Committee makes an Annual Report on the discharge of its functions and also produces Reports on specific issues.

[ … ]